Governança de Emergência e Combate à COVID-19 uma análise sobre Argentina e Brasil

Abstract

How does the emergency governance model influence the fight against COVID-19?
Historically, responses to emergency crises have been linked to the suspension of the Madisonian
logic of checks and balances in favor of expanding the capacity of the national executive to act. In a
different way, this article works with the hypothesis that responses to a pandemic in federal
countries with a Madisonian system of checks and balances are better constructed based on a
decentralized model of emergency governance and with coordinated action between the powers and
entities of the federation. The article analyzes the cases of Argentina and Brazil with a focus on the
performance of the respective national executive powers. The preliminary conclusions point out that
the centralism in the Argentine case, and the lack of coordination in the Brazilian case may have
contributed to the increase in cases and deaths of the pandemic in both countries.