National Leverage: Partisan Constraints on Reform in Sub-National Bureaucracies
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Abstract
Weak bureaucratic capacity fundamentally challenges the stability of new democracies. Decentralization has placed greater importance on low capacity sub-national bureaucracies. When, why and from who do we see successful reform initiatives of these bureaucracies? I argue that sub-national politicians in new democracies do not have political will or resources to reform. Rather, impetus for reform comes from threats to their resources, especially federal transfers, from the national level. Accordingly, the success of reforms depends on the national government’s commitment and often derailed by short-time horizons and political expediency. These constraints on national leverage are shown in Argentina’s Fiscal Pact of 1993. Partisanship and sub-national capacity are shown to interact to both fuel and temper reform initiatives.
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Ziegler Rogers, M. (2013). National Leverage:: Partisan Constraints on Reform in Sub-National Bureaucracies. Revista Sul-Americana De Ciência Política, 1(1), 112-137. https://doi.org/10.15210/rsulacp.v1i1.2314
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References
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SPILLER, Pablo; TOMMASI, Mariano. The institutional foundations of public policy in Argentina.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
STEPAN, Alfred. Federalism and democracy: beyond the U.S. model. Journal of Democracy, v. 10, n. 4, 1999, p. 19-34.
STOKES, Susan. Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, v. 99, n. 3, 2005, p. 315-326.
TOMMASI, Mariano; SAIEGH, Sebastian; SANGUINETTI, Pablo. Fiscal federalism in Argentina: policies, politics, and institutional reform. Economia, v. 1, 2001, p. 157–200.
WELLER, Nicholas. The Causes and Consequences of Tax Policy. Dissertation. University of California, San Diego. 2008.
______; LODOLA, Germán. The dual logic of intergovernmental transfers: presidents, governors, and the politics of coalition-building in Argentina. Publius, v. 41, n. 2, 2010, p. 179-206.
CALLANDER, Steven. A theory of policy expertise. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, v. 3, n. 2, 2008, p.123-40.
CALVO, Ernesto; MURILLO, Maria V. Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. American Journal of Political Science, v. 48, n. 4, 2004, p. 742–757.
COX, Gary W; McCUBBINS, Mathew D. The institutional determinants of economic policy outcomes. In: HAGGARD, Stephan; McCUBBINS, Mathew D. (Eds.). Presidents parliaments and policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
CRAWFORD, Vincent; SOBEL, Joel. Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, v. 50, n. 6, 1982, p. 1431-1451.
EATON, Kent. Decentralisation, democratisation and liberalisation: the history of revenue sharing in Argentina, 1934–1999. Journal of Latin American Studies v. 33, n. 1, 2001, p. 1-28.
______; DICKOVICK, Tyler. The politics of re-centralization in Argentina and Brazil. Latin American Research Review v. 39, n.1, 2004, p. 90-122.
GIBSON, Edward. Boundary control: subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries. World Politics, v. 58, n. 1, 2006, p. 101-132.
GORDIN, Jorge. Intergovernmental fiscal relations, “Argentine style”. Journal of Public Policy, v. 26, n. 3, 2006, p. 255–77.
GERVASONI, Carlos. A rentier theory of sub-national regimes: fiscal federalism, democracy, and authoritarianism in Argentina’s provinces. World Politics, v. 62, 2010, p. 302-340.
HUBER, John; SHIPAN, Charles. Deliberate discretion: the institutional foundations of bureaucratic autonomy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
JONES, Mark P.; SANGUINETTI, Pablo; TOMMASI, Mariano. Politics, institutions, and fiscal performance in a federal system: an analysis of the Argentine provinces. Journal of Development Economics, v. 61, n. 2, 2000, p. 305-333.
JONES, Mark P.; SAIEGH, Sebastián; SPILLER, Pablo; TOMMASI, Mariano. Amateur legislators - professional politicians: the consequences of party-centered electoral rules in a federal system. American Journal of Political Science, v. 46, n. 3, 2002, p. 656-669.
MAYHEW, David. Congress: the electoral connection. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.
NICOLINI, Juan Pablo; POSADAS, Josefina; SANGUINETTI, Juan Pablo; TOMMASI, Mariano. Decentralization, fiscal discipline in sub-national governments, and the bailout problem: the case of Argentina. Working Paper, University of San Andrés, 2002.
NORTH, Douglass C; WEINGAST, Barry R. Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in the seventeenth century England. Journal of Economic History, v. 49, 1989, p. 803-832.
PROVINCIA DE BUENOS AIRES, Noticias de Economia, Sep./Oct., 1994.
REMMER, Karen L.; E’LINEAU Francois. Subnational electoral choice. Economic and referendum voting in Argentina. Comparative Political Studies, v. 36, n. 7, 2003, p. 801–821.
ROGERS, Melissa Ziegler. The taxation tango: state capacity in Argentina’s provinces. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, San Diego, 2010.
______. Trading for development. Working Paper, 2012.
______; DONG-Wook Lee. Regional disparity and institutions in Argentina. Working Paper, 2012.
RUSSO, José Luis; DELGADO, Felisa Ceña. Evolución de la convergencia y disparidades provinciales en Argentina. Revista De Estudios Regionales, v. 57, 2000, p.151-173.
SAIEGH, Sebastian; TOMMASI, Mariano. Why is Argentina’s fiscal federalism so inefficient? Entering the labyrinth. Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, v. 0, 1999, p. 169-209.
SAMUELS, David J.; SNYDER, Richard. The value of the vote: malapportionment in comparative perspective. British Journal of Political Science, v. 31, n. 4, 2001, p. 651-672.
SAWERS, Larry. The other Argentina: the interior and national development. Boulder: Westview Press, 1998.
SCARTASCINI, C.; TRUCCO, L.; TOMMASI, M. Alternative political technologies and the workings of institutions. Buenos Aires: Universidad de San Andrés. Mimeographed document, 2009.
SCHEPSLE, Kenneth A. Studying institutions: lessons from the rational choice perspective. Journal of Theoretical Politics, v. 1, 1989, p.131-147.
SCHUGART, Matthew. Presidentialism, parliamentarianism, and the provision of collective goods in less-developed countries. Constitutional Political Economy, v. 10, n. 1, 1999, p. 53-88.
SCHWARTZ, Gerd; LIUKSILA Claire. Argentina. In: Fiscal federalism in theory and practice. Washington/DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997.
SNYDER, Richard. Scaling down: the sub-national comparative method. Studies in Comparative International Development, v. 36, n. 1, 2001, p. 93-110.
SPILLER, Pablo; TOMMASI, Mariano. The institutional foundations of public policy in Argentina.New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
STEPAN, Alfred. Federalism and democracy: beyond the U.S. model. Journal of Democracy, v. 10, n. 4, 1999, p. 19-34.
STOKES, Susan. Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. American Political Science Review, v. 99, n. 3, 2005, p. 315-326.
TOMMASI, Mariano; SAIEGH, Sebastian; SANGUINETTI, Pablo. Fiscal federalism in Argentina: policies, politics, and institutional reform. Economia, v. 1, 2001, p. 157–200.
WELLER, Nicholas. The Causes and Consequences of Tax Policy. Dissertation. University of California, San Diego. 2008.